Critical Theory And Critical Thinking

On September 18th, 2011, Barry Wellman, the early and rather prescient scholar of the Internet, posed a somewhat tongue-in-cheek question to the Communication and Information Technology Section of the American Sociology Association (CITASA): “‘Critical’ – aren’t we all?”  This post was precipitated by a call for papers for special issue of tripleC entitled Marx is Back: The Importance of Marxist Theory and Research for CriticalCommunication Studies Today (no affiliation with the author).  Specifically, the call invited papers that address (my emphasis):

what it means to ask Marx’s questions in 21st century informational capitalism, how Marxian theory can be used for critically analyzing and transforming media and communication today, and what the implications of the revival of the interest in Marx are for the field of Media and Communication Studies.

Shortly after it was sent, Wellman responded to the call, saying:

Not meant personally, but the use of the word “critical” by a subset of scholars always bothers me as leading to unconscious smugness? If I’m “critical”, your lot isn’t? Who, except flacks and twerps, isn’t critical? Can we criticize the criticalists?

This sparked a debate over the utility and appropriateness of the phrase “critical theory.”  Critics of the phrase raise the following objections:

  1. The phrase “Critical Theory” has been appropriated by one, heavily Marxist-inspired, tradition (though, it should be noted that the Frankfurt School also draws liberally from Weber, Freud, and others), which guards against its use by other theoretical perspectives.
  2. The use of the adjective “critical” implies an evaluation of work outside of this tradition as non-critical by comparison.
  3. By making such implicit evaluations, self-identified critical theorists consciously or unconsciously being smug with respect to their colleagues.

In this essay, I will argue that, despite these objections, the phrase “Critical Theory” makes a useful distinction and that the stakes in this debate are more than merely semantic.


I. Definition & Background

First, it is important to differentiate critical theory, critical sociology, and critical thinking. Critical Theory (with capital “C” & “T”). In common parlance, a critical theory is simply one that seeks to disprove or discredit an extant theory.  According to this definition, most professors are likely to engage in critical theorizing in their career.  It is simply one mode of academic discourse.  Sometimes, critical theory is called “negative theory” because it negates existing explanations of various phenomena, as opposed to positive theory whose purpose is new explanations.

Following this interpretation of critical theory, Michael Burawoy argued, in his 2004 presidential address to the American Sociological Association, that critical sociology is a distinct subset of sociology that challenges dominant paradigms within the discipline of sociology, saying “It is the role of critical sociology […] to examine the foundations—both the explicit and the implicit, both normative and descriptive—of the research programs of professional sociology.”

In contrast to the specificity of critical theory, “critical thinking” is a relatively vague term that generally implies thoroughness and rigor in making logical connections.  While critical theorizing generally occurs in professional academic discourse, critical thinking is widely valorized across various social strata.  Everybody is supposed to aspire to be a critical thinker.

“Critical Theory” (capital “C” & “T”) is distinct from the common noun phrase “critical theory.”  Critical Theory generally refers to a specific intellectual movement associated with the Frankfurt school, a few loosely associated figures, and their successors.  Critical Theory is not defined merely by rigor or thoughtfulness; therefore, the claim that something is not Critical Theory does not amount to a claim that something is not thoughtful or rigorous. Rather, “Critical Theory” is the name given to a distinct theoretical approach developed in reaction to a historically specific set of conditions.  The agenda of this theoretical program is laid out in Theodor Horkheimer’s (1937) seminal essay “Traditional and Critical Theory,” in which he explains:

The traditional idea of theory is based on scientific activity as carried on within the division of labor at a particular stage in the latter’s development. It corresponds to the activity of the scholar which takes place alongside all the other activities of a society but in no immediately clear connection with them. In this view of theory, therefore, the real social function of science is not made manifest

Critical Theory, on the other hand,

Although it itself emerges from the social structure, its purpose is not, either in its conscious intention or in its objective significance, the better functioning of any ele­ment in the structure. On the contrary, it is suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the present order, and re­fuses to take them as nonscientific presuppositions about which one can do nothing. […] such thinkers interpret the economic categories of work, value, and produc­tivity exactly as they are interpreted in the existing order, and they regard any other interpretation as pure idealism. But at the same time they consider it rank dishonesty simply to accept the interpretation; the critical acceptance of the categories which rule social life contains simultaneously their condemnation.

So, while traditional theorists attempt to refine and develop extant systems with respect to newly acquired data, Critical Theorists question the social implications of the very assumptions on which those systems are based.  They can do so only by first engaging in the history of sociology—that is, by making the shift from data to theory itself as the object of inquiry.  Then, secondarily, they must subject that theory to political inquiry, particularly questioning its position with respect to dominant ideologies.  Critical theorists ask: “Who benefits by starting from these assumptions?”  The Frankfurt School often suggested that people ignore explanations equally as plausible as their own assumptions due to mass manipulation, repression, or false consciousness.  The most important difference between traditional theory and Critical Theory is that the former aims to refine and reform a system, while the latter seeks a revolutionary disposition of that system. Traditional theory is about taking the set of tools you are given and trying to make them work better, While Critical Theory greets those same tools with suspicion and asks: Who benefits from these tools, can we use different tools, or can we put them to use in different ways?

Two points:

1.) Note that Horkheimer himself does not use “critical theory” as a proper noun phrase.  He was, in fact, trying to delineate two co-dependent tasks of scientific (i.e., rigorous and systematic)  inquiry, while alluding to the “critical philosophy” of an important predecessor, Immanuel Kant .  No doubt, the emphasis of his essay rests on critical theory which he believed was systematically inhibited by what Herbert Marcuse would latter call a “one-dimensional society” (i.e., a society where a single hegemonic ideology is so dominant that others become unthinkable or in-articulate-able).  Nevertheless, it is only in retrospect, historical scholars of social theory adopt the proper noun “Critical Theory” as a short-hand for the work of Horkheimer and his cadre of academics.

2.) A wide range of other terms d’art are equally evaluative: e.g., “Modern” implies passé, Feminist implies sexist, queer implies hetero-normative, etc.  It is simply a matter of accuracy to acknowledge that the tradition of Critical Theory defines itself in opposition economistic rationality, essentialism, structural functionalism, etc.  However, to degrade the well-founded and rigorously-defended antagonism captured in the phrase “Critical Theory” as a mere manifestation of “smugness”—especially, given that this revolutionary sentiment was expressed contra the burgeoning fascist state in Germany—is tantamount to dismissing feminism as women just being “uppity.”

II. The Politics of Preserving a Term

Let’s face it, the leaders of the Frankfurt school weren’t necessarily the most congenial folks.  Adorno was a particularly bitter curmudgeon, who was aggressive toward colleagues and dismissive toward students.  Parts of Horkheimer and Adorno’s famous essay on the culture industry is aloof, culturally insensitive, and smug at many points; nevertheless, it delivered a much needed dose of reality.  It’s hard to appreciate a pessimist; yet, sometimes we really need someone angry and disillusioned to point out everything we have swept under the rug.  I want to argue that the academy could use a few more curmudgeons.

While Barry Wellman and others insist that our positions in academia (or, at least, in sociology) require us all to be critical, I find there is reason to believe that the opposite is the case—that, in fact, structural conditions within the present-day academy inhibits a new generation of scholars from engaging in the kind of critical work done by the Frankfurt school and political allies such as C.W. Mills or Angela Davis.  Critical Theory’s goal of undermining present, unjust social relations (most notably capitalism) and the totalizing ideologies that sustain them is probably structurally incompatible with our discipline’s norms of evaluation, which elevate government grants above all else.

I’m a lowly grad student and have not yet been invited behind the velvet curtain of hiring committee meetings.  However, in preparing for my own job application process, I’ve been told again and again that committees (at major research institutions) are most interested in those candidates who have secured their own NSF/NIH funding.  To the extent that these anecdotes are representative of trends throughout the discipline of sociology, and academia more broadly, the incentive structure we have built implicitly favors projects that support goals intrinsic to our prevailing political and economic system (and thus making them likely to receive government funding), as opposed to those projects that serve to undermine the present social order and promote alternatives.

And, though certain established academics may find it relatively easy to obtain grants, criticizing capitalism and other structures of domination have not been particularly high on the government’s priority list lately.  In fact, academics championing the issues of the marginalized and trivialized are facing increasing political scrutiny from conservative movements (e.g., the recent Coburn report, which targeted dozens of specific researchers and prescribed the wholesale elimination of social science funding).

If we all were truly critical in the historical tradition of Critical Theory, then there would be far more discussion of the structural conditions of academia and which ideologies they promote. For the Critical Theorist, it is not sufficient to be thorough in one’s investigations, one must also choose one’s work on the basis of its political potential, which is always both facilitated and constrained by the structures in which we are embedded.  As it stands, I find little acknowledgement that disciplinary mechanisms of funding, evaluation, incentivization, etc. are, in fact, intrinsically political.  And, to the degree that we recognize our own complicity in these structures, such concerns are generally trumped by careerism.  When is the last time faculty have marched to draw attention to the precarious nature of life in the growing adjunct labor force or in solidarity with graduate students who the state fails to even recognize as workers (and, thus, as having the right to unionize)?  As the operating logic of universities comes to increasingly resemble that of a business, we should find it unsurprising that departments’ decision-making processes are increasingly rationalized.  Every time the (formally rational) question “How much money can this person bring to the department?” is asked, (substantively rational) questions regarding the social and political significance of an applicant’s work are supplanted.

Returning, now, to the initial question: perhaps Wellman is well-founded in observing a degree of unconscious smugness in the use of the term “critical,” but if this smugness exists, it is a sublimated manifestation of the profound frustration and disappointment many of us feel with respect to a discipline that is so rife with conflicts of interest and so embedded in the very structures of power and domination (which, ironically, we were once central in highlighting), that we have lost our collective capacity for self-reflexivity.  Dialectics are at a standstill.  We have been subsumed by the very structures we are supposed to be criticizing.  The role of Critical Theory is to seek conditions in which revolutionary ideas will again be possible.  It is not a popular message because it challenges the stakes we have claimed to prestige and other resources; but it is, nonetheless, important to those of us who believe in higher ideals of social justice.

In short, Critical Theory asks sociologists to bite the hand that feeds them.  Few oblige.

The aim of this paper is to examine the claim that critical thinking and perspective transformation derive from critical social theory or critical social science. It is argued that in fact they are much more likely to reflect the paradigms of humanistic psychology, and rest upon unexamined assumptions about the relationship between personal emancipation and social change.


Critical thinking is the latest fashionable challenge, both to adult learners and to adult educators constantly in search of new professional roles to play1. The aim of this paper is to challenge the assertion sometimes made2 that this conception of critical thinking is really based upon critical social science or critical social theory. Indeed it will be suggested that it is not based upon social theory of any kind, being profoundly psychologistic in its construction of society. For here society itself tends to be conceived in reductionist terms: as the threat to individuality posed by culture and socialisation rather than as the historical and structural forms of social relations whose content is primarily economic and political. History, the state and the economy are fundamental concepts of any genuinely social science, however phenomenologically they may be constructed, but they are conspicuous by their absence from the concept of critical thinking currently being advocated as an object of adult learning and its facilitation.

Critical thinking is in fact little more than the old idea of liberal education for democratic citizenship in new guise, more self-consciously informed by humanistic psychology and sited much more evidently in workplace management contexts of adult learning. Its theoretical underpinning is derived directly from such influential figures as Rogers and Maslow, and familiar psychological constructs of personal growth, authenticity, self-actualisation, self-direction, peak experiences and so on. Reflective and dialectical dimensions are constructed from an oppositional (i.e. traditionally liberal) concept of the relation between individual and society: critical thinking is a strategy of resistance on the part of individuals against over-socialisation or cultural over-determination, rationally balanced by an acceptance of the reality of existing social relations of production and power.

The unresolved question, both for critical thinking and traditional liberalism, remains that of the relation between individual and social transformation, personal and political emancipation. In short, the absence of authentic social structural concepts of history, state or power empties analytic concepts of much of this critical function, so that 'transformation', 'adaptation', 'reflectivity', 'dialectics', or even 'criticism' itself convey only an 'individual and society' meaning rather than one explicable wholly in terms of social science or social theory. The implication that generally individuals' thinking is not critical, or at least that the capacity for critical thinking is not sufficiently realised, does not reflect any kind of social science analysis at all: attributing uncritical thinking to the mass of the population (and if this were not the case how could there be an important role for the adult educator?) is an attribution of individual pathology rather than a discovery of critical social science.

Thus, although critical thinking and perspective transformation through adult learning have been attributed to critical social theory, and specifically to Habermas3, in reality this is only a new manifestation of personal growth psychology. According to the adult education usage, society is constructed as a value system rather than as a structure of social relations in economic and political terms, and the relation between individual and society reflects a functionalist and evolutionary view of mutual adaptation and of the ubiquity of personal and social change. Critical thinking reflects no problematic analysis of economic or political social relations, and the claim that it is connected with democracy through critical social science analysis should be viewed with considerable scepticism. Whatever view one takes of critical social science and its derivatives, whether of the Frankfurt school or Habermas himself, or Freire or Gramsci, it is difficult to evade some analysis of the social division of labour and the distribution of wealth and power which are associated with capitalist or other relations of production. It is difficult, in other words, to be a critical theorist without engaging in some critical analysis of economic relations, the distribution of power, the role of the state, and the different historical forms in which these have been expressed.

In fact, there never was a single tradition of critical theory, and it tends to be resistant to summary4. Nevertheless, it is possible to speak of a central core of issues which identify it as an intellectual movement, and its origins are generally located in the establishment in 1923 of the Institute for Social Research associated with the University of Frankfurt. The 'Frankfurt School' were primarily represented in the work of Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, whilst that of Jurgen Habermas later continued the tradition in modified form. These four are usually taken to be the 'central figures' of critical theory5.

In order to see critical theory in relation to critical thinking, it may be useful to summarise its central features as these have recently been described6. In the first place, as has been suggested, we are looking at a diverse tradition and it would be more accurate to speak of 'critical theories'. The emphasis of them all was, however, highly theoretical, and they were all preoccupied with social theory and theory construction for its own sake. All were agreed, too, that social theory is logically distinct from theories in natural science: in a science of humanity 'facts' are socially constructed, and critical social science, as distinct from positivism, recognises and acknowledges relativity and subjectivity in its object and methods. The critical theorists were, however, preoccupied with autonomy and the emancipation of oppressed individuals and groups and, as a school of Marxist thought, conceived society in terms of the irreconcilable conflicts of interest which lie beneath a veneer of harmony. Unlike other varieties of Marxism, however, critical theorists asserted the relative autonomy of culture from the economic base of society, and were concerned with the study of culture and human creativity as such. In contrast with stereotypical Marxism too, critical theorists emphasised the significance of individual identity and purpose, and the origins of what has since become known as cultural studies can be traced to the concern of critical theorists with ideology and its permeation of everyday life in the form of the ordinary and familiar common-sense ideas by which individuals construct their day-today worlds.

They were concerned with aesthetics as an expression of human creativity, and influenced by Freudian psychoanalytic theory, perceiving an analogy between the conflicting subconscious forces of the personality and the hidden conflicts of interest which lie below the surface of society itself.

It is easy to see how this kind of social theory could make a humanistic and liberal appeal, with its stress on individuality, creativity, emancipation, the pervasiveness of ideology and so on, and it seems a long way from the deterministic categories of some varieties of Marxist thinking. But it would be a mistake to confuse humanistic Marxism with humanistic psychology, and Gibson and others have argued that too much can be made of the individualism of critical theory and its conception of the relative autonomy of culture: in fact, the critical theorists remain 'wedded to the original theory' and operated overwhelmingly at the structural level of analysis7.

This being the case, it is evidently a risky undertaking to select particular themes or ideas from critical social theory and put them into the service of humanistic psychology, neglecting others of possibly equal significance. For example, critical theory may be of more importance for adult education as a theory of knowledge than as an inspiration for perspective transformation or critical thinking. According to this view, all forms of human understanding are socially constructed in the course of the development of relations of production. Moreover, since critical theory challenges the whole idea of the separation of theory and practice in human concerns, the entire notion of 'theory application' is fundamentally undermined: there is no possibility of an ideologically indifferent theory or practice. It follows that there would not be an ideologically disinterested role for adult educators in facilitating critical thinking amongst adult learners. The idea of criticism itself could not be entirely detached from the ideological context of practice any more than concepts such as personal growth or self-actualisation. Yet this is the view which would be entailed in adopting the perspective of critical theory.

A more authentic influence of critical theory may be detected in fairly eclectic notions such as Freire's 'conscientisation', or that of the critical pedagogy associated with it. The fact is that critical theory denies precisely the kind of 'instrumental rationality' or pragmatic and process-orientated methodology which often characterises North American thinking about adult education, presenting itself as a 'natural science' of human learning. Critical thinking, perspective transformation, andragogy, can all be put to universal purposes, whether these be the reinvigoration of democracy, the struggles of oppressed groups, or the learning needs of managers of international corporations. This is because they lack any kind of social structural reference and are, apparently, of no ideological significance.

Freire's ideas, and those of critical pedagogy generally8 are not claimed to originate in critical social theory, and Freire's own analysis could hardly be described as Marxist. And yet there is here a concept of relatively specific struggle, conflict and oppression which does have some structural reference to social relations of production, and there are other North American educationists who are consciously working within, or revising, a critical theory paradigm9.

So it is to these kinds of authors that adult educationists should turn in order to gain an understanding of the significance of critical theory for their practice. Characteristically, perhaps, adult education theory focuses much more upon issues of developing professional roles, and upon the instrumental rationality inherent in this particular task. It is difficult, therefore, to locate critical thinking in any tradition of radical schooling or critical pedagogy. In selecting the more humanistic and individualistic aspects of critical theory - those which can be put to instrumental use in adult learning terms - the perspective transformation theorists have neglected its ideological critique of knowledge itself. In focusing upon the emancipatory possibilities of Habermas' theory it is possible to reflect the ideological and structural analysis in which, according to him, all our ideas about emancipation are embedded, namely, the 'descriptive model of advanced capitalism':

Genuine participation of citizens in the processes of political will-formation (politischen Willensbildungsprozessen), that is, substantive democracy, would bring to consciousness the contradiction between administratively socialised production and the continued private appropriation and use of surplus value.10

But is critical thinking really connected with 'substantive democracy' in adult education theory? Almost certainly not, for the vision of the critical theorists was of a socialist rather than a liberal democracy. For this reason, the derivation of principles of professional practice such as perspective transformation or critical thinking, from critical social theory should be treated with caution. In the haste to create a distinctive body of adult education knowledge we should beware the temptation to take ideas from sources which are too radical to assimilate to professional practice without distortion. In advocating critical thinking and emancipation as objects of professional attention we should distinguish between emancipating individuals and changing society, lest we promise more than we can deliver.

One thought on “Critical Theory And Critical Thinking

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *